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Abstract This paper examines the inﬂation in housing prices between
1998 and 2005 and investigates whether this run-up in prices can
be ‘‘explained’’ by increases in demand fundamentals such as
population, income growth, and the decline in interest rates over
this period. Time series models are estimated for 59 MSA
markets and price changes from 1998 to 2005 are dynamically
forecast using actual economic fundamentals to drive the models.
In all 59 markets, the growth in fundamentals from 1998 to 2005
forecasts price growth that is far below that which actually
occurred. An examination of the 2005 forecast errors reveals they
are greater in larger MSAs, in MSAs where second home and
speculative buying was prevalent, and in MSAs where indicators
suggest the sub-prime mortgage market was most active. These
latter factors are unique to the recent housing market and hence
make it difﬁcult to asses if and how far housing prices will
‘‘correct’’ after 2005.
Recently there has been renewed interest in the behavior of the housing market
in the United States. The most common discussion is over whether prices have
risen ‘‘too’’ high relative to some benchmark. This paper avoids a normative
discussion and focuses instead on the ‘‘reasons’’ for the rapid rise in prices
between 1998 and 2006. The degree to which economic fundamentals contributed
to the rise is assessed by using time series analysis for each of 59 markets. It
becomes clear that prices rose far faster than would be called for by changes in
fundamentals. The ﬁndings reveal that the degree of ‘‘excess’’ price increase is
strongly related to two relatively new factors inﬂuencing the housing market: the
widespread availability of risk-priced mortgage credit, and the unusually strong
purchase of houses as second homes and investments. While these associations
are quite strong statistically, inferring causality is difﬁcult. It also makes it difﬁcult
to judge the duration of depth of the current housing correction.
The argument that there is a ‘‘bubble’’ in the recent housing market has been most
strongly put by Shiller (2006).1 He argues that the housing rent-to-price (R/P)
ratio has very gradually trended downward since 1913, but dropped more steeply2  Wheaton and Nechayev
since 1995. He compares this with real interest rates and stock dividends and
concludes that R/P ratios are too low and pricing is ‘‘excessive.’’ A clever paper
by Smith and Smith (2006), however, reinforces a major measurement issue with
the R/P approach—that median or average rent levels are just not comparable to
price levels. The typical apartment has no land and around 700 square feet, while
the median house has both a back yard and more than twice that square footage.
Furthermore, these characteristics have changed over time. In a carefully
constructed matched sample of single-family housing sales and rental units, they
ﬁnd that current R/P levels seem in general to be overly high—10% or more!
On the other side, Himmelberg, Mayer, and Sinai (HMS, 2005) argue that the
movements in real interest rates and incomes since 1976 have almost perfectly
matched the movement in prices (i.e., prices times a real interest rate have grown
almost the same as income). To HMS, prices are just perfectly following demand
fundamentals in the long run, although any discussion inferring market balance
has to factor in a demand elasticity. More importantly, yearly payment variations
are quite erratic and not closely related to fundamentals.
The current paper is organized as follows. In the next section, there is a brief
review of the data most often used to compare house prices and fundamentals and
like HMS conclude that the story is very different depending on in what MSA
the comparisons are being made. The modeling strategy is discussed next, along
the strategy for uncovering the true historic relationships between fundamentals
and prices—unique to each MSA. The estimation results follow including an
examination of the forecast errors made by the models between 1998 and 2005.
Two factors that are unique to the housing market of the last eight years are
examined that have not been part of previous housing market booms or
corrections. The ﬁrst is the emergence of a risk-priced sub-prime mortgage market
that has helped millions of households become home owners. The second is an
unusual growth in the demand for second homes or investment houses. These two
factors are highly correlated with the forecast errors in ways that would suggest
causality. The paper closes with cautions about inferring causality, and with
uncertainty about the future of the housing market in the U.S.
 How Much Have House Prices Risen Relative to Economic
Fundamentals?
Average house prices in the U.S. rose only 18% when adjusted for inﬂation over
the 23 years from 1975 until 1998 (Exhibit 1).2 During this same period, average
(not median) income per worker increased 12% and income per capita almost
40%. Household income (which is measured with less precision) grew between
these two. Thus with certainty, average housing prices over this earlier period
grew in line with income. Since 1998, however, prices have risen almost 50%
while incomes increased only between 5% and 11%. These last eight years have
indeed been remarkable.The 1998–2005 Housing ‘‘Bubble’’  3
JRER  Vol. 30  No. 1 – 2008








1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Income per Worker Income per Person
Home Price Home Payment
1975=100 (Constant $2005)
As HMS point out, this does not mean that housing has become less ‘‘affordable.’’
The annual cost of owning a dollar’s worth of housing incorporates interest rates,
taxes, and the likely net appreciation of the asset. Without going into the full
calculation, which invariably must make some assumptions about owner
estimation of future appreciation, the average housing price is simply multiplied
by the mortgage interest rate each year (the ‘‘home payment’’ series in Exhibit 1)
to arrive at the annual cash cost of owning a home. From 1975 through 1998, this
‘‘annual cash cost’’ of went through great ﬂuctuation, but on net did not change.
In 1998, housing was more ‘‘affordable’’ relative to income than in 1975. Since
1998, the annual payment cost has risen about 25%—outstripping income gains,
but only slightly as falling mortgage rates almost offset rising prices.
These kinds of comparisons vary radically by geography. Inﬂation-adjusted house
prices have shown dramatically different growth around the country (Exhibit 2).
From 1979 though 1998, real home prices rose 74% in Boston, 10% in Los4  Wheaton and Nechayev
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Angeles, 11% in Chicago and fell 21% in Dallas. Since 1998, the increases have
been 83% in Boston, 123% in Los Angeles, 42% in Chicago, and only 12% in
Dallas. Exhibit 3 shows that across these four (and other) areas, there was no
where near as much variation in real income growth. Real income per capita or
per worker grew gradually and quite similarly across regions. Once the change in
mortgage rates is factored in, the issue of affordability exists mostly in California
and the East Coast states.
 Modeling House Prices and Economic Fundamentals
An initial test of why house prices are rising is to see if all the changes in the
economic variables known to impact housing demand (fundamentals) can
‘‘forecast’’ the recent rise in prices over the last eight years. The best way to do
this is to estimate an econometric forecasting model using data only through some
date (here 1998). Then prices are forecast forward with this model using the actual
1998–2005 changes in that economic data. The question is whether the model
picks up the rapid rise in the last eight years.3
There is a long literature on house price forecasting models. As summarized by
Capozza, Hendershott, and Mack (CHM, 2004), there is wide consensus that asThe 1998–2005 Housing ‘‘Bubble’’  5
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Atlanta 32% 49% 9% 9% 0% 21%
Boston 42% 60% 74% 14% 11% 83%
Chicago 23% 34% 11% 7% 1% 42%
Dallas 26% 36% 26% 14% 3% 12%
Denver 22% 37% 6% 16% 9% 33%
Houston 27% 25% 38% 15% 7% 19%
Los Angeles 31% 13% 10% 12% 6% 123%
New York 49% 48% 56% 7% 6% 89%
Philadelphia 27% 44% 21% 7% 8% 60%
San Diego 13% 31% 1% 10% 17% 128%
San Francisco 46% 51% 43% 16% 9% 93%
Washington 26% 39% 6% 9% 15% 107%
Notes: The sources are the Bureau of the Census, Bureau of Labor Statistics, and OFHEO.
W  Cumulative % change in real income/employment.
Y  Cumulative % change in real income/population.
P  Cumulative % change in real home price index.
markets grow in employment and population, rents and prices should also increase.
There is likewise consensus that they should rise with income and move inversely
to some measure of the cost of capital. Like many authors in the past, CHM apply
an Error Correction Model (ECM) approach that uses these variables. The two-
stage ECM approach however has been recently questioned by Gallin (2006).
Instead, the current study favors a single-stage univariate model that simply
assumes that housing prices react to demand shocks with a response pattern that
is unique to a market. In such a case, prices are being directly predicted by
economic variables and possibly lagged prices—all either in levels or differences.
A possible criticism of this approach is that the supply side needs to be
incorporated more explicitly by jointly modeling prices and the housing stock
using a two-variable VAR. Early work by DiPasquale and Wheaton (1994) used
a structured VAR, while more recent papers by Evenson (2004) and Harter-
Dreiman (2004) use unstructured VAR models. These models are able to estimate
an implied supply elasticity for each market. Glaeser, Gyrouko, and Saks (2005)
argue that a declining supply elasticity has caused prices to rise ‘‘excessively’’ of
late—due largely to increased local development regulations. Identifying changes
in supply elasticities is possible; however, only if a unique instrument (e.g.,6  Wheaton and Nechayev
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‘‘regulation’’) can be found for the estimated VAR supply equation. Such an
instrument just does not exist for a wide enough range of markets and without it,
a univariate model is likely to be just as accurate in forecasting house prices, and
a lot more simple.4
It is also important to point out several important facts about the supply side of
the current housing market. First, the number of constructed single-family houses
in 2005 is seen to be at an all time record (Exhibit 4). When added to multi-
family units, total construction in 2005 was near two other previous peaks (1973,
1978). The ‘‘robustness’’ of recent supply will become even more apparent when
later compared to household formation. Thus there is little evidence of at least a
national supply ‘‘shortage’’ that might this time be the instigating factor behind
recent price inﬂation.
The ﬁrst univariate model is in price levels as shown in Equation (1). Current
prices are regressed on lagged prices and a set of current economic variables (Xt).
If the model works as theory would suggest, multiple price lags may need to be
allowed to correct both for the well-known autocorrelation of prices, as well as
to implicitly pick up the role of supply in the reaction to demand changes (GrangerThe 1998–2005 Housing ‘‘Bubble’’  7
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and Newbold, 1974). Hence in Equation (1) the j might be at ﬁrst positive and
then turn negative as new supply helps to quell the impact of demand shocks. For
this to produce a stable ‘‘impulse response,’’ the sum of the j must be less than
one. In any given market, the elasticity (or inelasticity) of supply is implicitly
picked up in the price response pattern. With perfectly elastic supply, eventually
prices return to their original level after a positive increase in an Xt variable. With
inelastic supply, they rise and generally remain high. Without lagged prices, the
model is effectively a moving equilibrium equation, in which autocorrelation will
need to be corrected with AR1 estimation.
An alternative version of the model is in Equation (2) where each variable is
differenced (in logs). This is a standard way of correcting for autocorrelation
without applying AR1 estimation. Lagged price differences are also added (as
suggested by Granger and Newbold, 1974) to possibly control for second-order
autocorrelation.
n
LogP  LogP  LogX. (1)  tj t jt
j1
n
Log(P /P )  Log(P /P )  Log(X /X ). (2)  tt 1 jt jt j1 tt 1
j1
 Results
The results of estimating Equations (1) and (2) are extremely dependent on the
combination of model and estimation technique employed.
When Model 1 is estimated in levels with no lagged prices, AR1 estimation
produces autocorrelation Rho values that are extremely close to 1.0, but the
correction (Hildreth-Lu) generates coefﬁcient estimates for the X variables that
are signiﬁcant and correctly signed. Without the AR1 correction, the signs of the
coefﬁcients on economic fundamentals are generally wrong and hence the model
(Model 1a) would be useless for assessing their role in determining prices.
When lagged prices are included into the levels equation, the R2 values jump
enormously and AR1 estimation still produces a very signiﬁcant Rho. The AR1
correction still is necessary in order to yield signiﬁcant and correctly signed X
variables. With OLS estimation, the X variables are incorrectly signed and only
lagged prices are signiﬁcant. This model is called Model 1b.
In Model 2a, all variables are measured in log changes rather than levels and with
no lagged price changes. Both OLS and AR1 estimation produce similar results
as there is little second-order autocorrelation. The results yield signiﬁcant and8  Wheaton and Nechayev
correctly signed X variables with similar point estimates to those obtained in
Model 1a when estimated with AR1.
When the variables are measured in log changes but with the addition of lagged
price changes (Model 2b), either estimation technique still yields little
autocorrelation, and the economic variables are generally signiﬁcant and correctly
signed. Lagged price changes are most often not signiﬁcant, consistent with
ﬁnding no autocorrelation in Model 2a.
The lesson learned here is that price changes are stationary, and have little
autocorrelation. Hence the estimation method chosen matters less and lagged
dependent variables increase R2 values, but have little impact on the X variable
coefﬁcients. Price levels, on the other hand, are extremely auto-correlated. If the
error speciﬁcation is corrected with AR1 then the models produce results
comparable to the equations in differences. If the error is ‘‘corrected’’using lagged
dependent variables with OLS (as offered by Granger and Newbold, 1974) the
model fails most tests of reasonableness. AR1 estimation hence appears to be
essential to any model based on price levels.
These models are estimated individually for each of 59 MSA markets (a table is
found in Appendix 1). The OFHEO repeat sales indices are used for prices, and
MSA total employment (LEMP) is used for economic variables, total personal
income divided by employment (LRINCEMP), and the 30-year ﬁxed mortgage
rate (LMRTG). Both real and nominal rates were examined, but nominal work
better in this instance. To illustrate the models and their application in more detail,
four estimated equations (described above) are presented for the Boston, Chicago,
and Phoenix markets in Appendix 2. Exhibits 5–7 show the data and forecast
results for each of these areas. In the exhibits, the upward triangles represent
Model 1b, the diamonds Model 2a, and the downward triangles Model 2b. Model
1a is virtually identical to 2a. The line with squares is the actual movement in
log (price level). The forecast with Model 2a or 2b is actually made in differences,
but then has been converted to levels for comparability with the levels forecasts.
The forecast errors for all 59 metropolitan markets (converted to a percent of 2006
prices) are found in Appendix 1, using a broader set of six equations that the
included the four models described here (Models 1a, 1b, 2a, 2b).
In the case of Boston, the ﬁrst frame in Figure 4 shows that the model forecast
completely misses the recent price growth if the forecast is started in 1998.5 The
recovery in prices from the trough in 1994 is forecast to continue for three more
years (adding 20% to real prices) and then a correction sets in after 2001. In fact,
prices have risen a full 50% (in constant dollars) without a correction since 2001.
The model’s forecast is the case of Boston is completely explainable, by turning
to the second frame in Exhibit 5. Like many regions, starting in mid 2001 there
is a downturn in the local economy (employment, square symbols) almost as
severe as the downturn in 1989–1992 and more severe than that in 1980–1983.The 1998–2005 Housing ‘‘Bubble’’  9
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Exhibit 5  Boston Model Results
BOSTON (#6)
























Furthermore, the recovery from 2003 to 2005 is actually less robust than that after
the previous two episodes. Finally, the fall in interest rates (diamond symbols)
from 2001 to 2005 appears no greater than that which occurred in the four
years following after the previous two recessions. Given these movements in
fundamentals, it is easy to understand how the model calls for a correction after
2001. The forecast error for Model 1b (42%) is less than that for Model 1a or 2a
(62%), but is high enough so as to completely miss the recent housing boom.
To varying degrees, this story is repeated in all of the 59 MSAs. In Chicago,
prices were essentially ﬂat in real terms through much of the 1980s and early
1990s and then picked up recently. Model 1b is able to capture some of this recent10  Wheaton and Nechayev
Exhibit 6  Chicago Model Results
CHICAGO  (#7)

























price growth, but still has a large 12% forecast error. The error with the other
models is far greater (40%).
Phoenix is typical of many southern and western markets (e.g., Florida, San Diego,
Las Vegas). Prices have stagnated or fallen in real dollars continuously since the
late 1970s, only to soar in recent years. The result across the models for these
types of areas is a very large forecast error. Again Model 1b generally has the
least error, but in the case of Phoenix and many such markets, the error is greater
than 70%. In most such markets the ‘‘explanation’’ for the model’s under-forecast
is also the same: the growth in economic fundamentals during 1998–2005 has
been generally weak and not as strong as earlier historical periods during which
house prices were not surging.The 1998–2005 Housing ‘‘Bubble’’  11
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Exhibit 7  Phoenix Model Results
PHOENIX (#43)



























Appendix 1 contains the forecast errors for each market as a percentage of current
prices, using a number of different models in addition to those described. These
forecast errors are so systematically signiﬁcant (in the same direction) as to
suggest that something completely new and different is characterizing the housing
market in the last decade. Two hypotheses are offered about what these new factors
might be.
 Credit-Propelled Homeownership: 1998–2005
One factor that has changed in the last ten years that would easily explain an
unusual growth in prices is the soaring national rate of homeownership. Between
1965 and 1995, the homeownership rate ﬂuctuated between 62% and 64% with
little discernable trend. Since 1995 it has jumped 5 percentage points and at the
end of 2005 stood at 69% (Exhibit 8). This movement was so pronounced that12  Wheaton and Nechayev
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over the last decade the total number of renters in the U.S. actually declined for
the ﬁrst time since WWII. What this has meant is that each year almost 500,000
renter households have switched to owning. A movement in demand this large
would certainly soften rents and put great pressure on prices, as Shiller (2006)
and others have documented. The question then is what has changed in the last
decade to explain homeownership growth?
The evolving demographic makeup of the country can account for only a small
part of the overall homeownership increase. If age-speciﬁc ownership rates are
weighed up by the changing age distribution (Exhibit 8, age-expected ownership
rate), there is only a very gentle 1% increase in projected ownership from 1995
to 2005. Per capita income growth might also be an explanation, but incomes
grew more in the 1960s and 1970s than in the last decade, so it too would be
hard to use as an explanation. Since it is also difﬁcult to disentangle factors in an
aggregate time series, the recent changes in homeownership are examined across
states from 2000 to 2005.6 The ﬁndings reveal that there is absolutely no statistical
relationship between the growth in ownership and that of per capita income.
Something new and different seems to be driving homeownership in the last
decade.The 1998–2005 Housing ‘‘Bubble’’  13
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Most probably the growth in U.S. homeownership and hence prices has been
driven by an explosive growth in credit availability, particularly the recent
emergence of the so-called ‘‘sub-prime’’ lending market. The emergence of this
market in the mid 1990s is perfectly timed with the beginning of the sharp rise
in U.S. homeownership (Exhibit 9). Prior to this time, most households with poor
credit ratings, or households seeking very aggressive underwriting were simply
rationed out of the mortgage market. Since that time, ‘‘risk-based pricing’’ has
provided ample credit in these situations—albeit at signiﬁcantly higher rates—
and often with subordinated loans. There seems to be no end to investors’appetite
for securitized pools of such ‘‘risky’’ loans. By 2005, almost a quarter of all loans
originated each year were sub-prime and the stock of sub-prime loans had reached
8% of total U.S. mortgage debt (Exhibit 9).
A number of studies have begun to explore the emergence of the sub-prime credit
market. Some have investigated whether pricing adequately reﬂects the market’s
higher default rates, others the question of whether lenders are somehow predatory
in attracting borrowers. In 2004, a special issue of the Journal of Real Estate
Finance and Economics was devoted to this relatively new market. Several more14  Wheaton and Nechayev
Exhibit 10  HMDA Data
Variable Deﬁnition
Variable l1 High-priced loans as % of all originations.
Variable l2 % loans originated by lenders deﬁned as ‘‘sub-prime.’’
Variable l4 High-priced ﬁrst lien loans as % of all high-priced originations.
Variable l5 High-priced ﬁrst lien loans as % of all ﬁrst lien originations.
Variable l6 High-priced ﬁrst lien loans as % of all originations.
Variable l7 Loans secured by subordinate lien as % of all originations.
Variable l8 High-priced subordinate loans as % of all high-priced originations.
Variable l9 High-priced subordinate loans as % of all subordinate originations.
Variable l10 High-priced subordinate loans as % of all originations.
Variable lti Average loan-to-income ratio.
Variable lti sp Average loan-to-income ratio for ‘‘sub-prime’’ loans.
recent studies have tried to identify geographic differences in the penetration of
this type of lending (e.g., Ho and Pennington-Cross, 2006) and borrower self-
selection between credit markets (Ben-Shahar, 2006).
This study would ideally like to have some pure measure of sub-prime credit
‘‘availability’’ or lending ‘‘supply’’ across metropolitan markets to see if it can
explain some of the differences in home price growth that cannot be explained
by local level economic variables. Any effort in this direction, however, will
immediately open up the difﬁcult problem of causation. If there is a statistical
relationship between the strength of sub-prime lending and residual house price
growth, is it the case that an exogenous change in lending is generating the surge
in demand and prices? Or, do the positive residuals reﬂect an unmeasured demand
shock, which then logically leads to the growth in lending outlets and originations?
Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) data, which contains basic information
on all mortgages originated yearly in the U.S., is used to examine this issue. Since
2004, the HMDA data contains speciﬁc information about rate spreads and ‘‘high-
priced’’ mortgages, as well as the originators who specialize therein. Using the
2004–2005 HMDA databases, and restricting the analysis to home purchase only
loans, the variables listed in Exhibit 10 were developed for each of the 59
markets.7
In evaluating this data, one must be careful to realize that most variables do not
at all represent the pure ‘‘supply’’of credit; rather they represent some equilibrium
outcome of supply against demand. Consider, for example, the fraction of loans
that are ‘‘high-priced’’ (deﬁned as carrying at least a 300 or 500 bps premiumThe 1998–2005 Housing ‘‘Bubble’’  15
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above the appropriate conforming loan rate). If a particular market did experience
a sudden inﬂux of sub-prime credit supply, the average loan rate in that market
could conceivably fall. An increase in sub-prime credit supply would generate
both a ‘‘mix effect’’ to higher rate loans, but with more total credit available, the
actual rate for any given type of loan could be lower. The overall outcome is
hence in doubt.
 Second and Investment Home Buying: 1998–2005
The current housing market has also seen a record number of housing sales to
investors and second home buyers. This is a statistic that is extremely difﬁcult to
determine and generally is not available consistently over time. Such activity is
estimated with two approaches. First, household formation can be compared with
unit production. Exhibit 11 shows that in the last few years, total housing
production has outstripped household formation by record amounts. Now to be
sure, over the long run production should exceed household formation to allow
for demolitions and replacements. In the last few years, however, production has
been 30%–60% in excess of new households. With rising prices, purchases of
continued excess production must reﬂect some form of ex-post housing demand
from non-owner occupiers.16  Wheaton and Nechayev
Exhibit 12  Investor and Second Home Buying
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A more direct way to examine such buying is to look at loan origination records
(again for home purchases), wherein the borrower must declare (by law) whether
the ﬁnancing is for purchase of a primary home, second home, or investment
property. This data is available from Loan Performance Inc. and goes back to the
late 1990s. The sum of ‘‘investor’’ and ‘‘second home’’ originations as a share of
all originations has increased sharply since 1999 (Exhibit 12). It is important to
note that these shares are orders of magnitude higher than the Census-reported
share of ‘‘seasonal’’ housing units in the stock (nationally around 3.5%). The
investor and second home share also has doubled in the last ﬁve years, despite
the fact that the reported data is just for 1–4 family units. These shares and their
growth would likely be greater had condominiums sales been included. In
addition, they also miss second home purchases ﬁnanced with expanded primary
home loans or with all-equity.
What is important about second homes and investment properties is that such
buying can more signiﬁcantly affect a market’s ‘‘net supply’’ or vacancy. Most
primary home purchasers make ‘‘churn’’ moves from one house to another; hence,
a transaction has little impact on market vacancy. A purchase/sale by a second
home owner can subtract/add more directly to vacancy, and many studies indicateThe 1998–2005 Housing ‘‘Bubble’’  17
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that prices are sensitive to small movements in housing vacancy and trading
volume (Leung, Lau, and Leong, 2002).
It is interesting to speculate on the causes of this recent buying trend. Some
suggest that it has resulted from baby-boomers ‘‘pre-buying’’ for retirement.
Other’s offer up that housing has become viewed as a ‘‘safe investment’’ relative
to stocks and bonds, particularly after the 2000 decline in the stock market. With
only aggregate time series, true explanations will be impossible to identify. In this
paper, however, the ﬁndings reveal that second home buying is at least strongly
related statistically to a particular market’s price growth—beyond the inﬂuence of
local economic fundamentals. Causal inference, however, is again a bit tricky. If
residual home prices are rising for some other reason, that could generate
investment buying in addition to the converse. There clearly can be joint causality
between these variables.
 A Cross-Sectional Analysis of 1998–2005 Forecast
Errors
Appendix 3 presents two cross-section equations. In each the dependent variable
is the 2005 forecast model error (percentage difference). On the RHS, the market
size (2000 housing units, variable HU00) is always signiﬁcant and the larger
metropolitan areas have more residual error or ‘‘excess’’ appreciation. Similarly
in virtually any equation that was speciﬁed, the share of loans in 2005 that are
for second or investment homes (variable INV2) is always very signiﬁcant. If the
increase in this share from 1999–2005 is used, there are similar results. If the
1999 share is used, the coefﬁcient is still highly signiﬁcant but smaller in
magnitude. In other words, no matter how measured, second home buying in a
market is strongly associated with ‘‘excess’’ price appreciation.
Assessing the role of credit availability is more complicated. HUD has identiﬁed
certain organizations as sub-prime credit originators, and when their average
origination share (2004–2005) is used in the equation (the variable L2), the
anticipated signs are obtained. Likewise if the share of loans in a market that are
subordinated is used (variable L7), this also works as well. This is to be expected
since many subordinated loans are sub-prime. What does not work well (in the
sense of having an unanticipated negative signed coefﬁcient) is any measure of
the share of loans that carry a ‘‘higher’’ contract interest rate (such as variables
L1, L4–L6, L8,o rL9). In these cases, the interest rate may be endogenous. The
ﬁnal variable that works extremely well is the underwriting of loans; in particular,
subordinated ones. While the HUD data does not have information on loan-to-
value, it does record loan balance to income (LTI). When the ratio of loan balance
to income is high, borrowers are being extended ever greater credit and this
variable works well whether overall ratios (LTI) are examined or just that for
subordinated loans (LTI SP). What is encouraging is that these three measures18  Wheaton and Nechayev
together explain almost two-thirds of the residual forecast error. The statistical
relationships are strong.
 Discussion of Causality
Clearly, the fact that all 59 MSA have signiﬁcant positive residuals on price
forecasts made from 1998, suggests that something new and different has been
driving the U.S. housing market in the last eight or more years. Local level
changes in income, employment, and national interest rates just do not explain
the movement in prices. The magnitude of the forecast errors in 2005 has also
been shown to be associated with greater buying in a market for second home
and investment use, and with the greater use of the sub-prime mortgage market
and looser loan underwriting. Does this constitute at least some evidence of a
‘‘bubble’’?
If joint causation between the price residuals and these factors is assumed, then
a bubble explanation is at least consistent with the statistics. As an example of
joint causation, suppose a positive shock to credit supply in a market sets off
home buying, which then in turn encourages further home buying (and the need
for more credit outlets) because ownership is perceived as a good investment.
The expansion of credit itself is just an overlooked or unmeasured change
in fundamentals, but the subsequent investment buying is a potential bubble.
Similarly, if baby-boomers are pre-buying second homes for true use in retirement,
then there is another unmeasured positive change to demand fundamentals.
However, if they are buying largely because housing has been perceived as a good
investment vehicle in these markets, there is again the potential for a bubble.
The only way to rule out some form of a bubble would be to positively identify
that the statistical relationships identiﬁed in this study are causal. Is it a surge in
credit supply and some change in second home preferences that is responsible for
greater home buying and hence ‘‘excess’’ price appreciation? If the converse is
also true, it would imply that excess appreciation is driving demand—the
traditional meaning of a bubble. Finding instruments or counter-factual evidence
to rule out investment buying in this case, however, seems hopelessly difﬁcult.
If not a bubble, the new factors driving the housing market make any prognosis
for the future extremely difﬁcult. If the market experiences some negative shock
going forward—for example, from rising interest rates—this time there are two
wild cards in the deck. Any economic slowdown could generate a much larger
increase in foreclosures than happened in the past as sub-prime borrowers are
more likely to default. In addition, if the market starts to turn down, investors
could bailout from housing far more easily than primary home owners. With these
two added factors, a ‘‘correction’’ could turn into a deeper housing slump than in
the past.The 1998–2005 Housing ‘‘Bubble’’  19
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 Appendix 1
  Actual to Forecasted, % Difference
Market EQ1 EQ2 EQ3 EQ4 EQ5 EQ6
ALBUQU 28.0 27.8 26.4 18.3 19.0 10.1
ATLANT 33.7 34.0 33.2 22.0 24.8 32.0
AUSTIN 67.3 74.0 55.5 42.7 45.4 30.5
BALTIM 75.5 75.5 75.6 64.7 65.6 64.7
BIRMIN 17.7 18.2 17.5 7.4 1.2 5.2
BOSTON 82.3 68.1 82.4 82.8 82.3 76.6
CHICAG 52.2 51.9 49.1 37.5 5.4 14.7
CHRLTE 13.3 13.6 12.5 4.4 5.0 4.1
CINCIN 23.8 24.0 23.7 16.4 2.0 3.4
CLEVEL 20.3 19.9 19.7 11.7 16.2 4.5
COLUMB 18.7 19.4 18.5 6.0 9.3 13.8
DALLAS 40.3 41.0 37.9 39.1 37.6 57.4
DAYTON 18.4 17.7 18.3 7.2 18.4 15.0
DENVER 47.8 42.6 47.7 31.1 28.2 107.1
DETROI 19.0 21.4 20.0 29.7 16.7 17.9
ELPASO 15.7 14.3 15.7 5.1 8.5 0.3
FORTLA 144.5 134.6 143.6 141.9 140.6 140.8
FORTWO 21.9 27.0 25.0 23.1 24.8 62.6
GREENS 22.1 21.3 19.7 4.8 8.1 1.9
GREENV 11.1 10.3 10.7 7.4 7.5 3.6
HONOLU 39.2 40.5 41.5 10.7 12.5 11.0
HOUSTO 39.5 40.9 38.0 29.9 95.3 85.7
INDIAN 10.8 11.7 10.8 5.0 3.8 3.4
JACKSO 86.6 89.6 87.5 66.1 71.0 79.1
KANSAS 39.7 38.7 38.5 29.6 45.7 10.7
LANGEL 76.1 102.3 99.1 94.6 107.8 133.0
LISLAN 77.5 93.0 87.9 85.8 72.3 57.5
LOUISV 19.8 19.9 20.0 10.7 23.7 20.0
LVEGAS 91.2 94.1 93.2 100.1 95.7 97.8
MEMPHI 13.9 14.6 12.6 10.8 20.7 0.1
MIAMI 109.7 111.4 110.9 117.3 112.0 107.5
MINNEA 59.9 61.5 60.8 58.3 24.8 22.2
NASHVI 20.9 20.4 20.5 1.6 3.3 1.020  Wheaton and Nechayev
 Appendix 1 (continued)
  Actual to Forecasted, % Difference
Market EQ1 EQ2 EQ3 EQ4 EQ5 EQ6
NEWYRK 67.0 71.0 67.7 67.2 25.3 25.6
NORFOL 65.0 64.9 65.3 55.2 65.2 34.3
OAKLAN 86.2 100.9 102.3 104.4 100.5 89.8
OKLAHO 27.1 32.2 27.1 21.6 19.6 154.6
ORANGE 84.6 115.6 117.4 127.7 94.5 145.4
ORLAND 88.7 90.1 88.2 85.9 86.3 62.8
PHILAD 60.9 59.0 61.2 61.6 61.1 30.9
PHOENI 100.5 100.6 100.6 99.9 100.2 77.7
PITTSB 18.2 19.7 18.2 7.5 21.3 20.4
PORTLA 35.6 35.8 35.3 29.1 26.2 9.8
RALEIG 20.8 20.6 19.4 2.5 0.7 8.6
RICHMO 49.4 50.6 50.1 34.8 27.4 31.8
RIVERS 114.6 103.6 111.8 113.1 163.9 192.0
SACRAM 112.6 126.9 125.0 119.9 124.7 82.5
SALTLA 17.2 17.5 14.4 1.8 0.7 10.9
SANTON 47.1 48.4 48.8 26.3 53.7 63.7
SDIEGO 149.6 153.4 148.3 146.9 147.9 77.7
SEATTL 65.8 71.7 67.1 63.1 62.6 52.7
SFRANC 56.1 54.5 68.2 91.1 69.0 73.7
SJOSE 48.5 57.9 86.9 91.3 83.4 20.9
SLOUIS 41.5 46.8 38.5 44.8 14.6 31.8
TAMPA 97.4 96.2 97.8 94.1 79.1 81.9
TUCSON 82.7 83.5 78.0 69.2 71.6 68.8
TULSA 24.5 27.4 24.4 19.8 33.4 48.3
WASHIN 93.2 91.5 92.9 92.7 92.7 88.6
WBEACH 163.1 163.7 160.5 139.2 139.0 108.0The 1998–2005 Housing ‘‘Bubble’’  21
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 Appendix 2
  Model 1
Boston Chicago Phoenix
Panel A: Models 1A
Coefﬁcient 52.987 4.799 141.864
Constant Std. Error 31.998 2.437 37.227
T-Statistic 1.656 1.970 3.811
Coefﬁcient 2.307 1.085 1.067
DLEMP Std. Error 0.340 0.242 0.220
T-Statistic 6.783 4.490 4.842
Coefﬁcient 0.622 0.101 0.708
LRINCEMP Std. Error 0.272 0.209 0.212
T-Statistic 2.287 0.482 3.336
Coefﬁcient 13.127 3.499 13.891
LMRTG Std. Error 4.600 3.751 3.860
T-Statistic 2.854 0.933 3.599
Coefﬁcient 1.000 0.974 1.000
RHO Std. Error 0.020 0.030 0.006
T-Statistic 51.238 33.013 181.851
Centered R2 0.9925 0.9685 0.9609
Durbin-Watson 1.8802 2.2756 1.9520
Panel B: Model 1B
Coefﬁcient 4.737 0.345 133.418
Constant Std. Error 2.568 0.151 43.197
T-Statistic 1.845 2.283 3.089
Coefﬁcient 0.278 1.825 0.046
RHPI (1) Std. Error 0.120 0.101 0.110
T-Statistic 2.324 18.017 0.420
Coefﬁcient 0.396 1.466 0.114
RHPI (2) Std. Error 0.103 0.200 0.102
T-Statistic 3.853 7.327 1.116
Coefﬁcient 0.081 0.891 0.005
RHPI (3) Std Error 0.085 0.196 0.103
T-Statistic 0.958 4.556 0.046
Coefﬁcient 0.080 0.301 0.127
RHPI (4) Std. Error 0.084 0.092 0.100
T-Statistic 0.946 3.270 1.26322  Wheaton and Nechayev
 Appendix 2 (continued)
  Model 1
Boston Chicago Phoenix
Coefﬁcient 0.588 0.045 0.970
LEMP Std. Error 0.316 0.043 0.289
T-Statistic 1.862 1.056 3.358
Coefﬁcient 0.341 0.044 0.699
LRINCEMP Std. Error 0.196 0.067 0.232
T-Statistic 1.739 0.655 3.016
Coefﬁcient 7.274 3.290 14.959
LMRTG Std. Error 3.331 0.955 4.135
T-Statistic 2.183 3.447 3.618
Centered R2 0.9963 0.9798 0.9631
Durbin-Watson 1.7712 2.0270 2.0329
 Appendix 2
  Model 2
Boston Chicago Phoenix
Panel A: Model 2A
Coefﬁcient 0.004 0.002 0.014
Constant Std. Error 0.003 0.002 0.004
T-Statistic 1.227 0.976 3.835
Coefﬁcient 2.308 1.192 1.067
DLEMP Std. Error 0.338 0.266 0.219
T-Statistic 6.831 4.487 4.875
Coefﬁcient 0.622 0.170 0.708
DLRINCE Std. Error 0.270 0.217 0.211
T-Statistic 2.304 0.784 3.359
Coefﬁcient 13.132 4.070 13.905
DLMRTG Std. Error 4.570 3.761 3.836
T-Statistic 2.874 1.082 3.625
Centered R2 0.3921 0.1964 0.3009
Durbin-Watson 1.8807 2.3678 1.9523The 1998–2005 Housing ‘‘Bubble’’  23
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 Appendix 2 (continued)
  Model 2
Boston Chicago Phoenix
Panel B: Model 2B
Coefﬁcient 0.002 0.003 0.013
Constant Std. Error 0.002 0.002 0.004
T-Statistic 0.866 1.309 3.099
Coefﬁcient 0.660 1.055 0.971
DLEMP Std. Error 0.322 0.327 0.287
T-Statistic 2.050 3.232 3.383
Coefﬁcient 0.385 0.145 0.700
DLRINCE Std. Error 0.198 0.203 0.230
T-Statistic 1.942 0.715 3.038
Coefﬁcient 7.696 5.017 14.970
DLMRTG Std. Error 3.327 3.478 4.107
T-Statistic 2.314 1.443 3.645
Coefﬁcient 0.269 0.007 0.046
DRHPI (1) Std. Error 0.119 0.114 0.109
T-Statistic 2.264 0.065 0.423
Coefﬁcient 0.390 0.197 0.114
DRHPI (2) Std. Error 0.102 0.101 0.102
T-Statistic 3.833 1.948 1.124
Coefﬁcient 0.080 0.266 0.005
DRHPI (3) Std. Error 0.084 0.100 0.103
T-Statistic 0.961 2.671 0.045
Coefﬁcient 0.078 0.245 0.127
DRHPI (4) Std. Error 0.083 0.100 0.100
T-Statistic 0.944 2.461 1.271
Centered R2 0.6328 0.3624 0.3181
Durbin-Watson 1.7848 2.0444 2.033124  Wheaton and Nechayev
 Appendix 3
Equation 1 Equation 2
Coefﬁcient 136.612 166.498
Constant Std. Error 26.405 30.006
T-Statistic 5.174 5.549
Coefﬁcient 1.04E-05 8.80E-06
HU00 Std. Error 5.40E-06 5.30E-06
T-Statistic 1.922 1.649
Coefﬁcient 3.137 3.114
INV2 Std. Error 0.561 0.514
T-Statistic 5.596 6.062
Coefﬁcient 57.451 68.920
LTI SP Std. Error 13.670 13.997
T-Statistic 4.203 4.924
Coefﬁcient 0.961 —
SP2 Std Error 0.716 —
T-Statistic 1.342 —
Coefﬁcient — 1.641
SP7 Std Error — 0.721
T-Statistic — 2.278
Centered R2 0.6162 0.6382
Notes:
LTI SP: Loan-to-income ratio for subprime loans as identiﬁed by HUD.
SP2: Subprime loan share identiﬁed by HUD based on originators.
SP7: Subprime loan share identiﬁed by share that are subordinate loans.
INV2: Share of 2005 home purchase loans made for 2nd or investment use.
HU00: 2000 number of housing units in MSA.
 Endnotes
1 Prices rising faster than what fundamentals dictate could be due to two reasons. First,
there could simply be overlooked fundamentals. Second, speculative demand could be
resulting from the rise in prices. In the classic deﬁnition, the ﬁrst does not constitute a
bubble, while the second does.
2 All prices used in this paper are based upon the OFHEO price index for the U.S. or
selected MSA. The OFHEO index uses repeated sales of identical properties. This
approach is known to have some biases, as discussed by Goetzmann (19920 and most
recently Harding, Rosenthal, and Sirmans (2007). These biases are likely to be less than
those inherent in the alternative—a median sales price index produced by the National
Association of Realtors.The 1998–2005 Housing ‘‘Bubble’’  25
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3 The models could be estimated with data through 2005, but this would create some bias
for the experiment. The forecasts of such a model from 1998 to 2005 would contain the
inﬂuence of the hypothesized recent ‘‘unknown’’ factors in so far as they are partially
correlated with economic fundamentals and hence alter the parameters of the latter.
4 Malpezzi (1996) has produced such an instrument for measuring regulation, but it is
available for only half of the markets in this study and its construction has been the
subject of debate.
5 In the top frame of Exhibit 6, prices are in natural logs of an index that starts at 100 in
1978. The bottom frame depicts the growth rate of employment and the mortgage interest
rate.
6 Homeownership at the MSA level is measured only with the decade census. Using state
level data for the change from 2000 to 2005: HO  1.01  .0003Y, R
2  .002. (HO
and Y are measured as cumulative ﬁve-year percentage changes.)
7 The HMDA database since the early 1990s has maintained information on mortgages
originated by entities specializing in ‘‘sub-prime’’ loans. Since this list is quite consistent
year to year, it could be used to identify a ‘‘sub-prime share’’ of loans in each market
and year. Since 2004, the HMDA database also contains information on loan pricing.
This study uses the list of originators and ‘‘higher priced’’ loans in only the 2004 and
2005 HMDA databases, averaging them for the cross-section comparison. In the
construction of all variables, only home purchase loans were included. See Avery and
Canner (2005).
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